This paper introduces conceptual relat ions tlr at sy ntlresizc utilitarian and logical con cepts, extending the logics of preference of [{escher.
Introduction
Tlw ability of logic -based proccdmes to represent k JJ u wledgc elctttcnts of rat . ht�r diverse characteristics 1vlrilc id e ntif"ying, by corrstructii'C proof , solutions of a wide 1·aric ty of proiJ!c ms is tire major rcasorr for their <tppt'al HS the base::-of a c lass of artificial intelligence tttct lto<lologic'S.
:\ristotlc, who established logic as the discipline In closing this introduction, it is very importa111 to re mark that our synthesis of utilitarian and logic;tl con cepts is not the result of I:1 trivial confusion or whal
is true and what is convenient. \Ve are simply stating that the truth value, measured in a multi,·aillcd sc;de, of propositions of the form:
given to s frotJl a specific vi('wpoil!t . .
Possible Worlds and Desirabilities
Our formalism is based on the notion of JWSsi/,fc II"Ur/d, whiclt will only be given a brief, infortrlld, cltaracter ization in this paper. Basically, a possible world, is any conceivable scenario: situation, or hciJa\'ior that may be used to describe the state ol· a re;d-world .sys tem. Each such situation is n1odclcd by a f"1111cl. ion, 
Desirability and P1·eference
As informally introdun�d aiJovc, dcsirahility nwasll rcs quantify the relative val11c of diff " crcnt. solut . io11s f" ront the viewpoint of a single constraint. or go<� I. 1\ltiJouglt
that discussion was confined t. o "lloJwlnst. ic" goals, cor responding to subsets of possible worlds, t. IIC lllost. itt teresting applications of util itarian COIICcpt' im·oh· <' n1easures ranging over a rontinuous scale.
3.1

Desirability Measures
The siuiplcst . way to f" ol'lllillizc tlw ttut.io11 uf adcqtti\ry of a solution is that. of' a lllCi:lSlll' C t. ilat as::-;igJt:-; a \"i . dllC of relative desirability to any COJlcCi\·< -lhlc soltJ1. ion, a:-; de termined solely from tl1e 1·icwpoint of a sit1 glc, specific go<d. In its simplest form, a solution corresponds to soJIIC fully specified description (i.e.,a possible world) ;1 ncl it 1nakes sense to st:ut. our fonnalisn1 with a real function defined over possible worlds ranging from 0, rcpn_•scnt. ing tot.a.l inadcq ttacy, to 1, representing total coiHpliaJJCe or satisfact.ioll with tlw goal. IIJcasuJ-cs and propositioual truth that this explicatiou i tl tpl ie.s kads to t.hf� cxtc-ttsiotl uf classical propos it ional ;-\lg:ci)J·<I, along well kllO\\'l! !ill<':-:;. iu to a tnult. iva . lucd t Jwt.l t o dolog;y for t.lwtr rat.iotl<d comhinatiou and ��g gn·g:t tiotl.
Ddiaitioa
lkforP discttssing sud1 Jllc1 ltods, lJoWc\'(: 'r, it is inlpor Lant to remark, o11cc agaiu , t!Jtlt. t.his conceptual uui fic<Jtion should not be iutcrpret.ed as an attempt to reduce issues of factual truth to matters of subjec tive c onve nie nce . Our view of truth as utility stems frolll the same epistemological principles that led Pe ter \l ed a war to clcscri hc science <1s ''the art of the solv <lblc.'' \Ve aill l to qu<dify solution adequacy by measur illg t il<' extent by which pote11t.ial a11swers fit factual rc;t!ity and the constraints of the problem. Furthcr lllOL'C', \Vc n HJst. stress t .
hat desirability measures qua u t.it�· re!at. ive preferences bct\\'ccn solutions, fron1 a. lin1-il<'d perspective, rather Llwn the overall desirability of a propos ition to c01ne a.b ont or its itnporta . nce a . n1ong various problern constra. ints.
n.dations between Desirability Measures
It would be rather odd if we were to say that a par Similarly, desirability rneasures quantifying the degree by wl1ich solutions meet the disjunction of two restric tions can be seen to be given by
where (j} is a . triangula1· cononn. :. l. The amount that we wouiJ be willing to pay to be iu w when we are in w" should be bound by above by a function of the amount that we would be willing to spend to be in w if we were in w ' and of the amount that we would be willing to pay to be in w' if we \Vere in tun. p(wlw"):::; p(wlw') ff; p(w'lw").
It is also easy to see that if p has the semantics of a relation represeuting graded preference, then iB should be a COllOl'l1l.
3.4
Relatious betweeu Desirabilities and Prefereuces
The conthination and aggregation of preference rela tons is considerable more complex than that . of desir <�bilit .
y lll<�asures as, for example. the negation � p of a preference relation (! is not itself a preference rela tion.
[n order to develop au aggregation methodology, it is necessary first to study the relations that. exist between both types of utilitarian measures.
Tile derivation of a f.f;-prefcrence relation PD from a desirabilit . J' 1ncasure D is l'<-tsily achieved by Inectns of tlw psC'udoiuversc · �. of+:
The inverse process of derivation of a uuique dc,;irabil ity 1neasure fro1n a preference relation is, in ge!leral, not possible. One of several representation theorems of Valverde [Valverde 85 ], exploiting in this case the identity p( wlw') = su p { p(w l w"J e p ( w'lw ")}'
w" in ll assures, however, that there is always a family {Do} of desirability measures such that
The above representation has a rnost natural iuterpre t . ation as the set of constraints (i.e.1 desirability I11ca surcs) that are iuvolved in the generalized order de fined by a preference rdat.ion, i.e., the criteria that make a solution better thau another. As it is of ten the case with conventional constraints, some of these generalized constraints 1nay never be �>active," being, in effect, superseded by more specific restric tions. For this reason, tltc above deco1nposition is never unique [Jacas 87]. \Ve n1ay, however, always de fine a unique "canonica . l dccornposition," which is sug gested by the proofs of Valverde's theorems. We will call the family of desirability measures {Du} defiucd by
for every w in U . 4
Combination of Preference Functions
The ability to express ally prdercllce fullctioll (i.e. rel ative adequacy of solutions) in terms of a collection of desirability measures (i.e .. criteria for ndcqnacy) also suggests a natural <-dgebr< · lic .�tructure for preference relations.
Definitiou:
Let p aud p' be two preference rel<l tions in the universe of discourse U . Furthermore. let { Dw } and { n;, } be the Valverde rcprescnt . at . ions of p and p1, respectively. rhcn the conjunction and disjunction of p and p' are the prel'crcnce fuucl.ious. denoted p \¥! p ' and f' �' p', associated with the gen erating fcunilics { Dw ·!_, n:, .. } . a11d { Dw �11 n:u } , respectively. Furthermore, the complclneut of pis the preference relation,...,_, p associated with t . h(� generating family { � Dw }. Ji'iually, the implication preference
1 is the preference rei at ion generated by the fnmily { D tv-D� } of desirability 1neasures.
5
Possibility and Necessity
It is often difficult to assess the adequacy of cer tain solutions ( or particular aspects of such solutions), even from the limited perspective provided by specific problem-solving goals. While steering a mobile robot around an obstacle, for example, it. is hard to deter mine if a particular move is preferrable to another from the viewpoint. of a maneuver to be performed much later at a. ren1ote location. In closing this section, \\'C tn:ly note that, in gencrn l, it is more likely that a p ml>kll t-soher will I"· illt. cr<'stcd in issues of desirabili ty of a class of solutions or pref erence between classes of solutions rather tlt<1n the the corresponding questious for possible worlds. U nfort.u u ately, it is not pos:::; ible to cha. . ra . ctcrizc such general utilitarian concepts using lHitneric-valued fu11cLions as asessments of the utility of a proposition pas a solution clepencl on the particular world w f-1' under consider ation. It is possible, hmrever, to define bounds Nv(P) = inf D(w) , and IID(JI) = iuf D(w) , wf-p which bound tl1e adequa c y of any p-world.
Note also th at such ho 1 111ds may be gcnc rcttcd front those of possible and necessary desirabili ty distribu tions for specific sol 11t.ions .
Conversely, values for
Nv(P ) and Ilu(P) clefinecl for ever y )J in an exhaus tive, disjoint, partition {p1, p,, . . . p,} of the universe U may also be used to define possible and necessary possibility distributions by means of the ex pre ssions
The preference of p-worlds on·r q-worlds, cts tncasurecl from the viewpoint of a prdicrencc relation (', t11ay be si t11ilarly defiucd uslllg the expressions N,,(Jil'l) = i11f i11f p(wlw'),
ICf-j> U:'f-q and Il p ( PI'I) = sup inf p(wlw'). presentee! a rationale for the iuterpretation of the pos sibilistic structures of fuzzy logic and for its major rule of derivation on the basis of similarity relations be tween possible worlds. Si1 1 1ilarity relations S assign a value S(w, w ' ) between 0 aml 1 to every pair of possi ble worlds w and w ' in such a way that Two possible worlds w and w ' may be considered simi lar if, from the perspective of all constraints defining a problem, the solutions that they represent have close desirability values. This statement, reflected by the well known relation S(w, w') =min ( � p( w [ w ' ), � p( w '[ w ) ) , pcrlllits derivation of a similarity relation from a pref erellce relatio11.
l·:xt.c•nsions of the notion of similari t. y to allow defini ticm of bounds for the resemblance between p-worlcb ami q-n'orlds, called de g re<C o[ illlplication and degree of corJ.sistence, which are abo the result, of applying a silllilar operation to the corresponding preference bounds N,(pfq) and II,(pfq), play an essential role in the interpretation of the possibility distributions of fuzzy logic.
